Add an heuristic to detect fully encrypted flows (#2058)

A fully encrypted session is a flow where every bytes of the
payload is encrypted in an attempt to “look like nothing”.
The heuristic needs only the very first packet of the flow.
See: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec23fall-prepub-234-wu-mingshi.pdf

A basic, but generic, inplementation of the popcpunt alg has been added
This commit is contained in:
Ivan Nardi
2023-07-26 09:09:12 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 2b230e28e0
commit 3326fa258e
17 changed files with 280 additions and 105 deletions
+39
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@@ -1831,3 +1831,42 @@ void ndpi_cm_sketch_destroy(struct ndpi_cm_sketch *sketch) {
ndpi_free(sketch->tables);
ndpi_free(sketch);
}
/* ********************************************************************************* */
/* ********************************************************************************* */
/* Popcount, short for "population count," is a computer programming term that refers to
the number of set bits (bits with a value of 1) in a binary representation of a given
data word or integer. In other words, it is the count of all the 1s present in the
binary representation of a number.
For example, consider the number 45, which is represented in binary as 101101.
The popcount of 45 would be 4 because there are four 1s in its binary representation.
*/
int ndpi_popcount_init(struct ndpi_popcount *h)
{
if(h) {
memset(h, '\0', sizeof(*h));
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
/* ********************************************************************************* */
void ndpi_popcount_count(struct ndpi_popcount *h, const u_int8_t *buf, u_int32_t buf_len)
{
u_int32_t i;
if(!h)
return;
/* Trivial alg. TODO: there are lots of better, more performant algorithms */
for(i = 0; i < buf_len / 4; i++)
h->pop_count += __builtin_popcount(*(u_int32_t *)(buf + i * 4));
for(i = 0; i < buf_len % 4; i++)
h->pop_count += __builtin_popcount(buf[buf_len - (buf_len % 4) + i]);
h->tot_bytes_count += buf_len;
}
+70
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@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ static ndpi_risk_info ndpi_known_risks[] = {
{ NDPI_PERIODIC_FLOW, NDPI_RISK_LOW, CLIENT_LOW_RISK_PERCENTAGE, NDPI_CLIENT_ACCOUNTABLE },
{ NDPI_MINOR_ISSUES, NDPI_RISK_LOW, CLIENT_LOW_RISK_PERCENTAGE, NDPI_BOTH_ACCOUNTABLE },
{ NDPI_TCP_ISSUES, NDPI_RISK_MEDIUM, CLIENT_FAIR_RISK_PERCENTAGE, NDPI_CLIENT_ACCOUNTABLE },
{ NDPI_FULLY_ENCRYPTED, NDPI_RISK_MEDIUM, CLIENT_FAIR_RISK_PERCENTAGE, NDPI_CLIENT_ACCOUNTABLE },
/* Leave this as last member */
{ NDPI_MAX_RISK, NDPI_RISK_LOW, CLIENT_FAIR_RISK_PERCENTAGE, NDPI_NO_ACCOUNTABILITY }
@@ -3062,6 +3063,9 @@ struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_init_detection_module(ndpi_init_prefs
if(prefs & ndpi_enable_tcp_ack_payload_heuristic)
ndpi_str->tcp_ack_paylod_heuristic = 1;
if(!(prefs & ndpi_disable_fully_encrypted_heuristic))
ndpi_str->fully_encrypted_based_on_first_pkt_heuristic = 1;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_CUSTOM_CATEGORIES; i++)
ndpi_snprintf(ndpi_str->custom_category_labels[i], CUSTOM_CATEGORY_LABEL_LEN, "User custom category %u",
(unsigned int) (i + 1));
@@ -5655,6 +5659,60 @@ static u_int8_t ndpi_is_multi_or_broadcast(struct ndpi_packet_struct *packet) {
/* ************************************************ */
static int fully_enc_heuristic(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_str,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow) {
struct ndpi_packet_struct *packet = &ndpi_str->packet;
struct ndpi_popcount popcount;
float ratio;
unsigned int i, len, cnt, cnt_consecutives = 0;
if(flow->l4_proto == IPPROTO_TCP &&
ndpi_seen_flow_beginning(flow)) {
/* See original paper, Algorithm 1, for the reference numbers */
/* Ex1 */
ndpi_popcount_init(&popcount);
ndpi_popcount_count(&popcount, packet->payload, packet->payload_packet_len);
ratio = (float)popcount.pop_count / (float)popcount.tot_bytes_count;
if(ratio <= 3.4 || ratio >= 4.6) {
return 0;
}
/* Ex2 */
len = ndpi_min(6, packet->payload_packet_len);
cnt = 0;
for(i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if(ndpi_isprint(packet->payload[i]))
cnt += 1;
}
if(cnt == len) {
return 0;
}
/* Ex3 */
cnt = 0;
for(i = 0; i < packet->payload_packet_len; i++) {
if(ndpi_isprint(packet->payload[i])) {
cnt += 1;
cnt_consecutives += 1;
if(cnt_consecutives >= 20) { /* Ex4 */
return 0;;
}
} else {
cnt_consecutives = 0;
}
}
if((float)cnt / packet->payload_packet_len > 0.5) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* ************************************************ */
static int tcp_ack_padding(struct ndpi_packet_struct *packet) {
const struct ndpi_tcphdr *tcph = packet->tcp;
if(tcph && tcph->ack && !tcph->psh &&
@@ -6553,6 +6611,12 @@ ndpi_protocol ndpi_detection_giveup(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_st
ret.app_protocol = flow->detected_protocol_stack[0];
}
/* TODO: not sure about the best "order" among fully encrypted logic, classification by-port and classification by-ip...*/
if(ret.app_protocol == NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN &&
flow->first_pkt_fully_encrypted == 1) {
ndpi_set_risk(ndpi_str, flow, NDPI_FULLY_ENCRYPTED, NULL);
}
/* Classification by-port */
if(enable_guess && ret.app_protocol == NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN) {
@@ -7229,6 +7293,12 @@ static ndpi_protocol ndpi_internal_detection_process_packet(struct ndpi_detectio
&& (flow->l4_proto == IPPROTO_TCP))
ndpi_add_connection_as_zoom(ndpi_str, flow);
if(ndpi_str->fully_encrypted_based_on_first_pkt_heuristic &&
ret.app_protocol == NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN && /* Only for unknown traffic */
flow->packet_counter == 1 && packet->payload_packet_len > 0) {
flow->first_pkt_fully_encrypted = fully_enc_heuristic(ndpi_str, flow);
}
return(ret);
}
+3
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@@ -2045,6 +2045,9 @@ const char* ndpi_risk2str(ndpi_risk_enum risk) {
case NDPI_TCP_ISSUES:
return("TCP Connection Issues");
case NDPI_FULLY_ENCRYPTED:
return("Fully encrypted flow");
default:
ndpi_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", (int)risk);
return(buf);