Improved detection of invalid SNI and hostnames in TLS, HTTP
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@@ -679,8 +679,18 @@ static void check_content_type_and_change_protocol(struct ndpi_detection_module_
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ndpi_hostname_sni_set(flow, packet->host_line.ptr, packet->host_line.len);
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flow->extra_packets_func = NULL; /* We're good now */
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if(strlen(flow->host_server_name) > 0) ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow, flow->host_server_name, 1);
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if(strlen(flow->host_server_name) > 0) {
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ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow, flow->host_server_name, 1);
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if(ndpi_is_valid_hostname(flow->host_server_name,
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strlen(flow->host_server_name)) == 0) {
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ndpi_set_risk(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_INVALID_CHARACTERS);
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/* This looks like an attack */
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ndpi_set_risk(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_POSSIBLE_EXPLOIT);
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}
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}
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if(packet->forwarded_line.ptr) {
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if(flow->http.nat_ip == NULL) {
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len = packet->forwarded_line.len;
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+26
-20
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ static int extractRDNSequence(struct ndpi_packet_struct *packet,
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const char *label) {
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u_int8_t str_len = packet->payload[offset+4], is_printable = 1;
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char *str;
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u_int len, j;
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u_int len;
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if(*rdnSeqBuf_offset >= rdnSeqBuf_len) {
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#ifdef DEBUG_TLS
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@@ -260,12 +260,7 @@ static int extractRDNSequence(struct ndpi_packet_struct *packet,
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buffer[len] = '\0';
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// check string is printable
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for(j = 0; j < len; j++) {
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if(!ndpi_isprint(buffer[j])) {
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is_printable = 0;
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break;
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}
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}
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is_printable = ndpi_is_printable_string(buffer, len);
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if(is_printable) {
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int rc = ndpi_snprintf(&rdnSeqBuf[*rdnSeqBuf_offset],
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@@ -488,7 +483,7 @@ static void processCertificateElements(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi
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/* If the client hello was not observed or the requested name was missing, there is no need to trigger an alert */
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if(flow->host_server_name[0] == '\0')
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matched_name = 1;
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#ifdef DEBUG_TLS
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printf("******* [TLS] Found subjectAltName\n");
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#endif
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@@ -497,7 +492,7 @@ static void processCertificateElements(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi
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/* skip the first type, 0x04 == BIT STRING, and jump to it's length */
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if(packet->payload[i] == 0x04) i++; else i += 4; /* 4 bytes, with the last byte set to 04 */
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if(i < packet->payload_packet_len) {
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i += (packet->payload[i] & 0x80) ? (packet->payload[i] & 0x7F) : 0; /* skip BIT STRING length */
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if(i < packet->payload_packet_len) {
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@@ -508,7 +503,7 @@ static void processCertificateElements(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi
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while(i < packet->payload_packet_len) {
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u_int8_t general_name_type = packet->payload[i];
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if((general_name_type == 0x81) /* rfc822Name */
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|| (general_name_type == 0x82) /* dNSName */
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|| (general_name_type == 0x87) /* ipAddress */
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@@ -546,7 +541,7 @@ static void processCertificateElements(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi
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strncpy(dNSName, (const char*)&packet->payload[i], len);
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dNSName[len] = '\0';
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}
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dNSName_len = strlen(dNSName);
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cleanupServerName(dNSName, dNSName_len);
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@@ -555,8 +550,17 @@ static void processCertificateElements(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi
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flow->host_server_name, len,
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packet->payload_packet_len-i-len);
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#endif
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if(ndpi_is_printable_string(dNSName, dNSName_len) == 0)
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ndpi_set_risk(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_INVALID_CHARACTERS);
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/*
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We cannot use ndpi_is_valid_hostname() as we can have wildcards
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here that will create false positives
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*/
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if(ndpi_is_printable_string(dNSName, dNSName_len) == 0) {
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ndpi_set_risk(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_INVALID_CHARACTERS);
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/* This looks like an attack */
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ndpi_set_risk(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_POSSIBLE_EXPLOIT);
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}
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if(matched_name == 0) {
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#if DEBUG_TLS
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@@ -666,13 +670,13 @@ static void processCertificateElements(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi
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printf("TLS] %s() issuerDN %s / %s\n", __FUNCTION__,
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flow->protos.tls_quic.issuerDN, head->value);
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#endif
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if(strcmp(flow->protos.tls_quic.issuerDN, head->value) == 0)
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return; /* This is a trusted DN */
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else
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head = head->next;
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}
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ndpi_set_risk(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_TLS_SELFSIGNED_CERTIFICATE);
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}
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@@ -1794,11 +1798,13 @@ int processClientServerHello(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
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#ifdef DEBUG_TLS
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printf("[TLS] SNI: [%s]\n", sni);
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#endif
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if(ndpi_is_printable_string(sni, sni_len) == 0)
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{
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ndpi_set_risk(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_INVALID_CHARACTERS);
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if(ndpi_is_valid_hostname(sni, sni_len) == 0) {
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ndpi_set_risk(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_INVALID_CHARACTERS);
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/* This looks like an attack */
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ndpi_set_risk(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_POSSIBLE_EXPLOIT);
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}
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if(!is_quic) {
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if(ndpi_match_hostname_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_TLS, sni, sni_len))
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flow->protos.tls_quic.subprotocol_detected = 1;
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@@ -1845,7 +1851,7 @@ int processClientServerHello(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
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#ifdef DEBUG_TLS
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printf("Client TLS [EllipticCurve: %u/0x%04X]\n", s_group, s_group);
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#endif
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if((s_group == 0) || (packet->payload[s_offset+i] != packet->payload[s_offset+i+1])
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if((s_group == 0) || (packet->payload[s_offset+i] != packet->payload[s_offset+i+1])
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|| ((packet->payload[s_offset+i] & 0xF) != 0xA)) {
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/* Skip GREASE */
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if(ja3.client.num_elliptic_curve < MAX_NUM_JA3)
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