Quic fixes (#1067)
* QUIC: fix return value on error path on quic_cipher_init() * QUIC: allow dissection of sessions forcing version negotiation Enhance heuristic to avoid false positives.
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@@ -80,7 +80,8 @@ static int is_version_gquic(uint32_t version)
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static int is_version_quic(uint32_t version)
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{
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return ((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0xFF000000) /* IETF */ ||
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((version & 0xFFFFF000) == 0xfaceb000) /* Facebook */;
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((version & 0xFFFFF000) == 0xfaceb000) /* Facebook */ ||
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((version & 0x0F0F0F0F) == 0x0a0a0a0a) /* Forcing Version Negotiation */;
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}
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static int is_version_valid(uint32_t version)
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{
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@@ -90,6 +91,14 @@ static uint8_t get_u8_quic_ver(uint32_t version)
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{
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if((version >> 8) == 0xff0000)
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return (uint8_t)version;
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/* "Versions that follow the pattern 0x?a?a?a?a are reserved for use in
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forcing version negotiation to be exercised".
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It is tricky to return a correct draft version: such number is primarly
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used to select a proper salt (which depends on the version itself), but
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we don't have a real version here! Let's hope that we need to handle
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only latest drafts... */
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if ((version & 0x0F0F0F0F) == 0x0a0a0a0a)
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return 29;
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return 0;
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}
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#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
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@@ -152,6 +161,13 @@ int is_version_with_var_int_transport_params(uint32_t version)
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return (is_version_quic(version) && is_quic_ver_greater_than(version, 27)) ||
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(version == V_T051);
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}
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int is_version_with_ietf_long_header(uint32_t version)
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{
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/* At least draft-ietf-quic-invariants-06, or newer*/
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return is_version_quic(version) ||
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((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x51303500) /* Q05X */ ||
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((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x54303500) /* T05X */;
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}
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int quic_len(const uint8_t *buf, uint64_t *value)
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{
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@@ -497,7 +513,7 @@ static int quic_cipher_init(quic_cipher *cipher, int hash_algo,
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if(!quic_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, hash_len, "quic key", write_key, key_length) ||
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!quic_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, hash_len, "quic iv", cipher->pp_iv, sizeof(cipher->pp_iv)) ||
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!quic_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, hash_len, "quic hp", hp_key, key_length)) {
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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return gcry_cipher_setkey(cipher->hp_cipher, hp_key, key_length) == 0 &&
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@@ -1032,19 +1048,15 @@ static uint8_t *get_clear_payload(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_stru
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clear_payload = (uint8_t *)&packet->payload[30];
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*clear_payload_len = packet->payload_packet_len - 30;
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} else {
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/* Upper limit of CIDs length has been already validated. If dest_conn_id_len is 0,
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this is probably the Initial Packet from the server */
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dest_conn_id_len = packet->payload[5];
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if(dest_conn_id_len == 0 ||
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dest_conn_id_len > QUIC_MAX_CID_LENGTH) {
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if(dest_conn_id_len == 0) {
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NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Packet 0x%x with dest_conn_id_len %d\n",
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version, dest_conn_id_len);
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return NULL;
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}
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source_conn_id_len = packet->payload[6 + dest_conn_id_len];
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if(source_conn_id_len > QUIC_MAX_CID_LENGTH) {
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NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Packet 0x%x with source_conn_id_len %d\n",
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version, source_conn_id_len);
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return NULL;
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}
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#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
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const u_int8_t *dest_conn_id = &packet->payload[6];
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clear_payload = decrypt_initial_packet(ndpi_struct, flow,
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@@ -1168,6 +1180,7 @@ static int may_be_initial_pkt(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
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struct ndpi_packet_struct *packet = &flow->packet;
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u_int8_t first_byte;
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u_int8_t pub_bit1, pub_bit2, pub_bit3, pub_bit4, pub_bit5, pub_bit7, pub_bit8;
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u_int8_t dest_conn_id_len, source_conn_id_len;
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/* According to draft-ietf-quic-transport-29: "Clients MUST ensure that UDP
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datagrams containing Initial packets have UDP payloads of at least 1200
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@@ -1220,6 +1233,33 @@ static int may_be_initial_pkt(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
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return 0;
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}
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/* Forcing Version Negotiation packets are QUIC Initial Packets (i.e.
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Long Header). It should also be quite rare that a client sends this kind
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of traffic with the QUIC bit greased i.e. having a server token.
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Accordind to https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-quic-bit-grease-00#section-3.1
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"A client MAY also clear the QUIC Bit in Initial packets that are sent
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to establish a new connection. A client can only clear the QUIC Bit
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if the packet includes a token provided by the server in a NEW_TOKEN
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frame on a connection where the server also included the
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grease_quic_bit transport parameter." */
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if((*version & 0x0F0F0F0F) == 0x0a0a0a0a &&
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!(pub_bit1 == 1 && pub_bit2 == 1)) {
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NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Version 0x%x with first byte 0x%x\n", first_byte);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Check that CIDs lengths are valid: QUIC limits the CID length to 20 */
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if(is_version_with_ietf_long_header(*version)) {
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dest_conn_id_len = packet->payload[5];
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source_conn_id_len = packet->payload[5 + 1 + dest_conn_id_len];
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if (dest_conn_id_len > QUIC_MAX_CID_LENGTH ||
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source_conn_id_len > QUIC_MAX_CID_LENGTH) {
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NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Version 0x%x invalid CIDs length %u %u",
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*version, dest_conn_id_len, source_conn_id_len);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* TODO: add some other checks to avoid false positives */
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return 1;
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