config: remove enum ndpi_prefs
This commit is contained in:
@@ -211,11 +211,10 @@ extern "C" {
|
||||
* indipendent detection contexts) but all these calls MUST NOT run
|
||||
* in parallel
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @par prefs = load preferences
|
||||
* @return the initialized detection module
|
||||
*
|
||||
*/
|
||||
struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_init_detection_module(ndpi_init_prefs prefs);
|
||||
struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_init_detection_module(void);
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Completes the initialization (2nd step)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -149,6 +149,24 @@ typedef struct {
|
||||
struct ndpi_detection_module_config_struct {
|
||||
int max_packets_to_process;
|
||||
int direction_detect_enabled;
|
||||
/* In some networks, there are some anomalous TCP flows where
|
||||
the smallest ACK packets have some kind of zero padding.
|
||||
It looks like the IP and TCP headers in those frames wrongly consider the
|
||||
0x00 Ethernet padding bytes as part of the TCP payload.
|
||||
While this kind of packets is perfectly valid per-se, in some conditions
|
||||
they might be treated by the TCP reassembler logic as (partial) overlaps,
|
||||
deceiving the classification engine.
|
||||
Add an heuristic to detect these packets and to ignore them, allowing
|
||||
correct detection/classification.
|
||||
See #1946 for other details */
|
||||
int tcp_ack_paylod_heuristic;
|
||||
/* Heuristic to detect fully encrypted sessions, i.e. flows where every bytes of
|
||||
the payload is encrypted in an attempt to “look like nothing”.
|
||||
This heuristic only analyzes the first packet of the flow.
|
||||
See: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec23fall-prepub-234-wu-mingshi.pdf */
|
||||
int fully_encrypted_heuristic;
|
||||
int track_payload_enabled;
|
||||
int libgcrypt_init;
|
||||
|
||||
char filename_config[CFG_MAX_LEN];
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1505,30 +1505,6 @@ typedef struct {
|
||||
u_int16_t value;
|
||||
} ndpi_network6;
|
||||
|
||||
typedef u_int32_t ndpi_init_prefs;
|
||||
|
||||
typedef enum {
|
||||
ndpi_no_prefs = 0,
|
||||
ndpi_dont_init_libgcrypt = (1 << 1),
|
||||
ndpi_track_flow_payload = (1 << 16),
|
||||
/* In some networks, there are some anomalous TCP flows where
|
||||
the smallest ACK packets have some kind of zero padding.
|
||||
It looks like the IP and TCP headers in those frames wrongly consider the
|
||||
0x00 Ethernet padding bytes as part of the TCP payload.
|
||||
While this kind of packets is perfectly valid per-se, in some conditions
|
||||
they might be treated by the TCP reassembler logic as (partial) overlaps,
|
||||
deceiving the classification engine.
|
||||
Add an heuristic to detect these packets and to ignore them, allowing
|
||||
correct detection/classification.
|
||||
See #1946 for other details */
|
||||
ndpi_enable_tcp_ack_payload_heuristic = (1 << 17),
|
||||
/* Heuristic to detect fully encrypted sessions, i.e. flows where every bytes of
|
||||
the payload is encrypted in an attempt to “look like nothing”.
|
||||
This heuristic only analyzes the first packet of the flow.
|
||||
See: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec23fall-prepub-234-wu-mingshi.pdf */
|
||||
ndpi_disable_fully_encrypted_heuristic = (1 << 20),
|
||||
} ndpi_prefs;
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
u_int32_t protocol_id;
|
||||
ndpi_protocol_category_t protocol_category;
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user