@@ -1454,8 +1454,7 @@ struct ndpi_flow_struct {
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* NDPI_PROTOCOL_OPENVPN */
|
||||
u_int8_t ovpn_session_id[8];
|
||||
u_int8_t ovpn_counter;
|
||||
u_int8_t ovpn_session_id[2][8];
|
||||
|
||||
/* NDPI_PROTOCOL_TINC */
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||||
u_int8_t tinc_state;
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+167
-94
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
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#include "ndpi_api.h"
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||||
#include "ndpi_private.h"
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||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*
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||||
* OpenVPN TCP / UDP Detection - 128/160 hmac
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||||
*
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||||
@@ -34,10 +35,6 @@
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* - packet ID
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* - session ID
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||||
*
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||||
* Two (good) packets are needed to perform detection.
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* - First packet from client: save session ID
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* - Second packet from server: report saved session ID
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||||
*
|
||||
* TODO
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||||
* - Support PSK only mode (instead of TLS)
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||||
* - Support PSK + TLS mode (PSK used for early authentication)
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||||
@@ -46,37 +43,82 @@
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||||
*/
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||||
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||||
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 (0x01 << 3)
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#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 (0x07 << 3)
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||||
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 (0x02 << 3)
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||||
#define P_CONTROL_V1 (0x04 << 3)
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||||
#define P_ACK_V1 (0x05 << 3)
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||||
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 (0x07 << 3)
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||||
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 (0x08 << 3)
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#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 (0x0A << 3)
|
||||
#define P_CONTROL_WKC_V1 (0x0B << 3)
|
||||
|
||||
#define P_OPCODE_MASK 0xF8
|
||||
#define P_SHA1_HMAC_SIZE 20
|
||||
#define P_HMAC_128 16 // (RSA-)MD5, (RSA-)MD4, ..others
|
||||
#define P_HMAC_160 20 // (RSA-|DSA-)SHA(1), ..others, SHA1 is openvpn default
|
||||
#define P_HMAC_NONE 0 // No HMAC
|
||||
#define P_HARD_RESET_PACKET_ID_OFFSET(hmac_size) (9 + hmac_size)
|
||||
#define P_PACKET_ID_ARRAY_LEN_OFFSET(hmac_size) (P_HARD_RESET_PACKET_ID_OFFSET(hmac_size) + 8)
|
||||
#define P_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_MAX_COUNT 5
|
||||
#define P_PACKET_ID_ARRAY_LEN_OFFSET(hmac_size) (P_HARD_RESET_PACKET_ID_OFFSET(hmac_size) + 8 * (!!(hmac_size)))
|
||||
|
||||
static
|
||||
#ifndef WIN32
|
||||
inline
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
u_int32_t get_packet_id(const u_int8_t * payload, u_int8_t hms) {
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||||
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||||
|
||||
static int is_opcode_valid(u_int8_t opcode)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Ignore:
|
||||
* P_DATA_V1/2: they don't have any (useful) info in the header
|
||||
* P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1: it is used to key renegotiation -> it is not at the beginning of the session
|
||||
*/
|
||||
return opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 ||
|
||||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 ||
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||||
opcode == P_CONTROL_V1 ||
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||||
opcode == P_ACK_V1 ||
|
||||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 ||
|
||||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ||
|
||||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ||
|
||||
opcode == P_CONTROL_WKC_V1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static u_int32_t get_packet_id(const u_int8_t * payload, u_int8_t hms) {
|
||||
return(ntohl(*(u_int32_t*)(payload + P_HARD_RESET_PACKET_ID_OFFSET(hms))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static
|
||||
#ifndef WIN32
|
||||
inline
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
int8_t check_pkid_and_detect_hmac_size(const u_int8_t * payload) {
|
||||
/* From wireshark */
|
||||
/* We check the leading 4 byte of a suspected hmac for 0x00 bytes,
|
||||
if more than 1 byte out of the 4 provided contains 0x00, the
|
||||
hmac is considered not valid, which suggests that no tls auth is used.
|
||||
unfortunatly there is no other way to detect tls auth on the fly */
|
||||
static int check_for_valid_hmac(u_int32_t hmac)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int c = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if((hmac & 0x000000FF) == 0x00000000)
|
||||
c++;
|
||||
if((hmac & 0x0000FF00) == 0x00000000)
|
||||
c++;
|
||||
if ((hmac & 0x00FF0000) == 0x00000000)
|
||||
c++;
|
||||
if ((hmac & 0xFF000000) == 0x00000000)
|
||||
c++;
|
||||
if (c > 1)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int8_t detect_hmac_size(const u_int8_t *payload, int payload_len) {
|
||||
// try to guess
|
||||
if(get_packet_id(payload, P_HMAC_160) == 1)
|
||||
if((payload_len >= P_HARD_RESET_PACKET_ID_OFFSET(P_HMAC_160) + 4) &&
|
||||
get_packet_id(payload, P_HMAC_160) == 1)
|
||||
return P_HMAC_160;
|
||||
|
||||
if(get_packet_id(payload, P_HMAC_128) == 1)
|
||||
if((payload_len >= P_HARD_RESET_PACKET_ID_OFFSET(P_HMAC_128) + 4) &&
|
||||
get_packet_id(payload, P_HMAC_128) == 1)
|
||||
return P_HMAC_128;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* Heuristic from Wireshark, to detect no-HMAC flows (i.e. tls-crypt) */
|
||||
if(payload_len >= 14 &&
|
||||
!(payload[9] > 0 &&
|
||||
check_for_valid_hmac(ntohl(*(u_int32_t*)(payload + 9)))))
|
||||
return P_HMAC_NONE;
|
||||
|
||||
return(-1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -90,89 +132,120 @@ static void ndpi_search_openvpn(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct* ndpi_struct
|
||||
int8_t hmac_size;
|
||||
int8_t failed = 0;
|
||||
/* No u_ */int16_t ovpn_payload_len = packet->payload_packet_len;
|
||||
int dir = packet->packet_direction;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Detection:
|
||||
* (1) server and client resets matching (via session id -> remote session id)
|
||||
* (2) consecutive packets (in both directions) with the same session id
|
||||
* (3) asymmetric traffic
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
if(ovpn_payload_len < 14 + 2 * (packet->tcp != NULL)) {
|
||||
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
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||||
return;
|
||||
}
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||||
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||||
if(ovpn_payload_len >= 40) {
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||||
// skip openvpn TCP transport packet size
|
||||
if(packet->tcp != NULL)
|
||||
ovpn_payload += 2, ovpn_payload_len -= 2;;
|
||||
/* Skip openvpn TCP transport packet size */
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||||
if(packet->tcp != NULL)
|
||||
ovpn_payload += 2, ovpn_payload_len -= 2;
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||||
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||||
opcode = ovpn_payload[0] & P_OPCODE_MASK;
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||||
opcode = ovpn_payload[0] & P_OPCODE_MASK;
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||||
if(!is_opcode_valid(opcode)) {
|
||||
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
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||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Maybe a strong assumption... */
|
||||
if((ovpn_payload[0] & ~P_OPCODE_MASK) != 0) {
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Invalid key id\n");
|
||||
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if(flow->packet_direction_counter[dir] == 1 &&
|
||||
!(opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 ||
|
||||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 ||
|
||||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 ||
|
||||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ||
|
||||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3)) {
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Invalid first packet\n");
|
||||
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if(flow->packet_direction_counter[dir] == 1 &&
|
||||
packet->tcp &&
|
||||
ntohs(*(u_int16_t *)(packet->payload)) != ovpn_payload_len) {
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Invalid tcp len on reset\n");
|
||||
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(packet->udp) {
|
||||
#ifdef DEBUG
|
||||
printf("[packet_id: %u][opcode: %u][Packet ID: %d][%u <-> %u][len: %u]\n",
|
||||
flow->num_processed_pkts,
|
||||
opcode, check_pkid_and_detect_hmac_size(ovpn_payload),
|
||||
htons(packet->udp->source), htons(packet->udp->dest), ovpn_payload_len);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if(
|
||||
(flow->num_processed_pkts == 1)
|
||||
&& (
|
||||
((ovpn_payload_len == 112)
|
||||
&& ((opcode == 168) || (opcode == 192))
|
||||
)
|
||||
|| ((ovpn_payload_len == 80)
|
||||
&& ((opcode == 184) || (opcode == 88) || (opcode == 160) || (opcode == 168) || (opcode == 200)))
|
||||
)) {
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_INFO(ndpi_struct,"found openvpn\n");
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "[packets %d/%d][opcode: %u][len: %u]\n",
|
||||
flow->packet_direction_counter[dir],
|
||||
flow->packet_direction_counter[!dir],
|
||||
opcode, ovpn_payload_len);
|
||||
|
||||
if(flow->packet_direction_counter[dir] > 1) {
|
||||
if(memcmp(flow->ovpn_session_id[dir], ovpn_payload + 1, 8) != 0) {
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Invalid session id on two consecutive pkts in the same dir\n");
|
||||
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if(flow->packet_direction_counter[dir] >= 2 &&
|
||||
flow->packet_direction_counter[!dir] >= 2) {
|
||||
/* (2) */
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_INFO(ndpi_struct,"found openvpn (session ids match on both direction)\n");
|
||||
ndpi_set_detected_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_OPENVPN, NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN, NDPI_CONFIDENCE_DPI);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if(flow->packet_direction_counter[dir] >= 4 &&
|
||||
flow->packet_direction_counter[!dir] == 0) {
|
||||
/* (3) */
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_INFO(ndpi_struct,"found openvpn (asymmetric)\n");
|
||||
ndpi_set_detected_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_OPENVPN, NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN, NDPI_CONFIDENCE_DPI);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(flow->ovpn_counter < P_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_MAX_COUNT && (opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 ||
|
||||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2)) {
|
||||
if(check_pkid_and_detect_hmac_size(ovpn_payload) > 0) {
|
||||
memcpy(flow->ovpn_session_id, ovpn_payload+1, 8);
|
||||
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct,
|
||||
"session key: %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n",
|
||||
flow->ovpn_session_id[0], flow->ovpn_session_id[1], flow->ovpn_session_id[2], flow->ovpn_session_id[3],
|
||||
flow->ovpn_session_id[4], flow->ovpn_session_id[5], flow->ovpn_session_id[6], flow->ovpn_session_id[7]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if(flow->ovpn_counter >= 1 && flow->ovpn_counter <= P_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_MAX_COUNT &&
|
||||
(opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 || opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2)) {
|
||||
|
||||
hmac_size = check_pkid_and_detect_hmac_size(ovpn_payload);
|
||||
|
||||
if(hmac_size > 0) {
|
||||
u_int16_t offset = P_PACKET_ID_ARRAY_LEN_OFFSET(hmac_size);
|
||||
|
||||
alen = ovpn_payload[offset];
|
||||
|
||||
if (alen > 0) {
|
||||
offset += 1 + alen * 4;
|
||||
|
||||
if((offset+8) <= ovpn_payload_len) {
|
||||
session_remote = &ovpn_payload[offset];
|
||||
|
||||
if(memcmp(flow->ovpn_session_id, session_remote, 8) == 0) {
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_INFO(ndpi_struct,"found openvpn\n");
|
||||
ndpi_set_detected_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_OPENVPN, NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN, NDPI_CONFIDENCE_DPI);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct,
|
||||
"key mismatch: %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n",
|
||||
session_remote[0], session_remote[1], session_remote[2], session_remote[3],
|
||||
session_remote[4], session_remote[5], session_remote[6], session_remote[7]);
|
||||
failed = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else
|
||||
failed = 1;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
failed = 1;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
failed = 1;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
failed = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
flow->ovpn_counter++;
|
||||
|
||||
if(failed)
|
||||
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
memcpy(flow->ovpn_session_id[dir], ovpn_payload + 1, 8);
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Session key [%d]: 0x%lx\n", dir,
|
||||
ndpi_ntohll(*(u_int64_t *)flow->ovpn_session_id[dir]));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* (1) */
|
||||
if(flow->packet_direction_counter[!dir] > 0 &&
|
||||
(opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 ||
|
||||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2)) {
|
||||
|
||||
hmac_size = detect_hmac_size(ovpn_payload, ovpn_payload_len);
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "hmac size %d\n", hmac_size);
|
||||
failed = 1;
|
||||
if(hmac_size >= 0 &&
|
||||
P_PACKET_ID_ARRAY_LEN_OFFSET(hmac_size) < ovpn_payload_len) {
|
||||
u_int16_t offset = P_PACKET_ID_ARRAY_LEN_OFFSET(hmac_size);
|
||||
|
||||
alen = ovpn_payload[offset];
|
||||
|
||||
if(alen > 0) {
|
||||
offset += 1 + alen * 4;
|
||||
|
||||
if((offset + 8) <= ovpn_payload_len) {
|
||||
session_remote = &ovpn_payload[offset];
|
||||
|
||||
if(memcmp(flow->ovpn_session_id[!dir], session_remote, 8) == 0) {
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_INFO(ndpi_struct,"found openvpn\n");
|
||||
ndpi_set_detected_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_OPENVPN, NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN, NDPI_CONFIDENCE_DPI);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "key mismatch 0x%lx\n", ndpi_ntohll(*(u_int64_t *)session_remote));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
failed = 0; /* Server reset without remote session id field */
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(failed)
|
||||
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
|
||||
|
||||
if(flow->packet_counter > 5)
|
||||
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user