Added new check for detecting suspicious (too long) names

This commit is contained in:
Luca Deri
2020-08-21 19:35:27 +02:00
parent b23781e807
commit fef199ad45
7 changed files with 65 additions and 21 deletions
+2 -2
View File
@@ -83,10 +83,10 @@ typedef enum {
NDPI_BLACKLISTED_HOST,
/* Leave this as last member */
NDPI_MAX_RISK
NDPI_MAX_RISK /* must be <= 31 due to (**) */
} ndpi_risk_enum;
typedef u_int32_t ndpi_risk;
typedef u_int32_t ndpi_risk; /* (**) */
/* NDPI_VISIT */
typedef enum {
+53 -12
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ extern u_int32_t get_stun_lru_key(struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow, u_int8_t rev);
static int _ndpi_debug_callbacks = 0;
/* #define DGA_DEBUG 1 */
/* #define MATCH_DEBUG 1 */
/* ****************************************** */
@@ -6599,14 +6600,13 @@ static int enough(int a, int b) {
/* ******************************************************************** */
/* #define DGA_DEBUG 1 */
int ndpi_check_dga_name(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_str,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow,
char *name) {
int len, rc = 0;
u_int8_t max_num_char_repetitions = 0, last_char = 0, num_char_repetitions = 0;
u_int8_t max_domain_element_len = 0, curr_domain_element_len = 0;
len = strlen(name);
if(len >= 5) {
@@ -6624,20 +6624,61 @@ int ndpi_check_dga_name(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_str,
max_num_char_repetitions = num_char_repetitions;
} else
num_char_repetitions = 1, last_char = tmp[j];
switch(tmp[j]) {
case '.':
case '-':
case '_':
case '/':
case ')':
case '(':
case ';':
case ':':
case '[':
case ']':
case ' ':
/*
Domain/word separator chars
NOTE:
this function is used also to detect other type of issues
such as invalid/suspiciuous user agent
*/
if(curr_domain_element_len > max_domain_element_len)
max_domain_element_len = curr_domain_element_len;
curr_domain_element_len = 0;
break;
default:
curr_domain_element_len++;
break;
}
j++;
}
if(curr_domain_element_len > max_domain_element_len)
max_domain_element_len = curr_domain_element_len;
if(max_num_char_repetitions > 5 /* num or consecutive repeated chars */) {
/*
In case of a name with too many consecutive chars an alert is triggered
This is the case for instance of the wildcard DNS query used by NetBIOS
(ckaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa) and that can be exploited
for reflection attacks
- https://www.akamai.com/uk/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/ddos-reflection-netbios-name-server-rpc-portmap-sentinel-udp-threat-advisory.pdf
- http://ubiqx.org/cifs/NetBIOS.html
#ifdef DGA_DEBUG
printf("[DGA] [max_num_char_repetitions: %u][max_domain_element_len: %u]\n",
max_num_char_repetitions, max_domain_element_len);
#endif
if(
(max_num_char_repetitions > 5 /* num or consecutive repeated chars */)
/*
In case of a name with too many consecutive chars an alert is triggered
This is the case for instance of the wildcard DNS query used by NetBIOS
(ckaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa) and that can be exploited
for reflection attacks
- https://www.akamai.com/uk/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/ddos-reflection-netbios-name-server-rpc-portmap-sentinel-udp-threat-advisory.pdf
- http://ubiqx.org/cifs/NetBIOS.html
*/
NDPI_SET_BIT(flow->risk, NDPI_SUSPICIOUS_DGA_DOMAIN);
|| (max_domain_element_len >= 19 /* word too long. Example bbcbedxhgjmdobdprmen.com */)
) {
if(flow) NDPI_SET_BIT(flow->risk, NDPI_SUSPICIOUS_DGA_DOMAIN);
return(1);
}
+3
View File
@@ -1537,6 +1537,9 @@ const char* ndpi_risk2str(ndpi_risk_enum risk) {
case NDPI_TLS_SUSPICIOUS_ESNI_USAGE:
return("TLS Suspicious ESNI Usage");
case NDPI_BLACKLISTED_HOST:
return("Blacklisted Host");
default:
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", (int)risk);
return(buf);