Added extension to detect nested subdomains as used in Browsertunnel attack tool

https://github.com/veggiedefender/browsertunnel
This commit is contained in:
Luca Deri
2020-09-09 23:25:19 +02:00
parent 842c00e681
commit 7086197047
10 changed files with 61 additions and 48 deletions
+2 -2
View File
@@ -3327,10 +3327,10 @@ static void dgaUnitTest() {
assert(ndpi_str != NULL);
for(i=0; dga[i] != NULL; i++)
assert(ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_str, NULL, (char*)dga[i]) == 1);
assert(ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_str, NULL, (char*)dga[i], 1) == 1);
for(i=0; non_dga[i] != NULL; i++)
assert(ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_str, NULL, (char*)non_dga[i]) == 0);
assert(ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_str, NULL, (char*)non_dga[i], 1) == 0);
ndpi_exit_detection_module(ndpi_str);
}
+1 -1
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@@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ extern "C" {
/* DGA */
int ndpi_check_dga_name(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_str,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow,
char *name);
char *name, u_int8_t is_hostname);
/* Serializer */
int ndpi_init_serializer_ll(ndpi_serializer *serializer, ndpi_serialization_format fmt,
+48 -36
View File
@@ -6665,10 +6665,10 @@ static int enough(int a, int b) {
int ndpi_check_dga_name(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_str,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow,
char *name) {
char *name, u_int8_t is_hostname) {
int len, rc = 0;
u_int8_t max_num_char_repetitions = 0, last_char = 0, num_char_repetitions = 0;
u_int8_t max_domain_element_len = 0, curr_domain_element_len = 0;
u_int8_t max_num_char_repetitions = 0, last_char = 0, num_char_repetitions = 0, num_dots = 0;
u_int8_t max_domain_element_len = 0, curr_domain_element_len = 0, first_element_is_numeric = 1;
len = strlen(name);
@@ -6685,45 +6685,52 @@ int ndpi_check_dga_name(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_str,
}
for(i=0, j=0; (i<len) && (j<(sizeof(tmp)-1)); i++) {
tmp[j] = tolower(name[i]);
tmp[j] = tolower(name[i]);
if(last_char == tmp[j]) {
if(++num_char_repetitions > max_num_char_repetitions)
max_num_char_repetitions = num_char_repetitions;
} else
num_char_repetitions = 1, last_char = tmp[j];
if(tmp[j] == '.')
num_dots++;
else if(num_dots == 0) {
if(!isnumber(tmp[j]))
first_element_is_numeric = 0;
}
if(last_char == tmp[j]) {
if(++num_char_repetitions > max_num_char_repetitions)
max_num_char_repetitions = num_char_repetitions;
} else
num_char_repetitions = 1, last_char = tmp[j];
switch(tmp[j]) {
case '.':
case '-':
case '_':
case '/':
case ')':
case '(':
case ';':
case ':':
case '[':
case ']':
case ' ':
/*
Domain/word separator chars
switch(tmp[j]) {
case '.':
case '-':
case '_':
case '/':
case ')':
case '(':
case ';':
case ':':
case '[':
case ']':
case ' ':
/*
Domain/word separator chars
NOTE:
this function is used also to detect other type of issues
such as invalid/suspiciuous user agent
*/
if(curr_domain_element_len > max_domain_element_len)
max_domain_element_len = curr_domain_element_len;
NOTE:
this function is used also to detect other type of issues
such as invalid/suspiciuous user agent
*/
if(curr_domain_element_len > max_domain_element_len)
max_domain_element_len = curr_domain_element_len;
curr_domain_element_len = 0;
curr_domain_element_len = 0;
break;
default:
curr_domain_element_len++;
break;
}
default:
curr_domain_element_len++;
break;
}
j++;
j++;
}
if(curr_domain_element_len > max_domain_element_len)
@@ -6735,7 +6742,12 @@ int ndpi_check_dga_name(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_str,
#endif
if(
(max_num_char_repetitions > 5 /* num or consecutive repeated chars */)
(is_hostname
&& (num_dots > 5)
&& (!first_element_is_numeric)
&& (strstr(tmp, "in-addr.arpa") == NULL)
)
|| (max_num_char_repetitions > 5 /* num or consecutive repeated chars */)
/*
In case of a name with too many consecutive chars an alert is triggered
This is the case for instance of the wildcard DNS query used by NetBIOS
+1 -1
View File
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ static void ndpi_search_dns(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct, st
if(j > 0) {
ndpi_protocol_match_result ret_match;
ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow, (char*)flow->host_server_name);
ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow, (char*)flow->host_server_name, 1);
ret.app_protocol = ndpi_match_host_subprotocol(ndpi_struct, flow,
(char *)flow->host_server_name,
+2 -5
View File
@@ -263,15 +263,12 @@ static void ndpi_check_user_agent(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_stru
char *ua) {
if((!ua) || (ua[0] == '\0')) return;
// printf("***** [%s:%d] ==> '%s'\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, ua);
// printf("***** %u\n", ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, NULL, "uclient-fetch]"));
if((strlen(ua) < 4)
|| (!strncmp(ua, "test", 4))
|| (!strncmp(ua, "<?", 2))
|| strchr(ua, '{')
|| strchr(ua, '}')
|| ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, NULL, ua)
|| ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, NULL, ua, 0)
// || ndpi_match_bigram(ndpi_struct, &ndpi_struct->impossible_bigrams_automa, ua)
) {
NDPI_SET_BIT(flow->risk, NDPI_HTTP_SUSPICIOUS_USER_AGENT);
@@ -438,7 +435,7 @@ static void check_content_type_and_change_protocol(struct ndpi_detection_module_
flow->host_server_name[len] = '\0';
flow->extra_packets_func = NULL; /* We're good now */
if(len > 0) ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow, (char*)flow->host_server_name);
if(len > 0) ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow, (char*)flow->host_server_name, 1);
flow->server_id = flow->dst;
if(packet->forwarded_line.ptr) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static void ndpi_int_netbios_add_connection(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct
flow->packet.payload_packet_len - off, name, sizeof(name)) > 0) {
snprintf((char*)flow->host_server_name, sizeof(flow->host_server_name)-1, "%s", name);
ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow, (char*)flow->host_server_name);
ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow, (char*)flow->host_server_name, 1);
}
if(sub_protocol == NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN)
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1161,7 +1161,8 @@ int processClientServerHello(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
flow->l4.tcp.tls.subprotocol_detected = 1;
}
ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow, flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.client_requested_server_name);
ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow,
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.client_requested_server_name, 1);
} else {
#ifdef DEBUG_TLS
printf("[TLS] Extensions server len too short: %u vs %u\n",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int ndpi_is_tls_tor(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
if((dot = strrchr(dummy, '.')) == NULL) return(0);
name = &dot[1];
if(ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow, name)) {
if(ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow, name, 1)) {
ndpi_int_tor_add_connection(ndpi_struct, flow);
return(1);
} else {
Binary file not shown.
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Google 2 262 1
1 UDP 192.168.1.168:65311 <-> 8.8.8.8:53 [proto: 5.126/DNS.Google][cat: Web/5][1 pkts/103 bytes <-> 1 pkts/159 bytes][Goodput ratio: 59/73][0.02 sec][Host: gmr02c.16.0.fhkfhsdkfhsk.tunnel.example.com][::][Risk: ** Suspicious DGA domain name **][PLAIN TEXT (fhkfhsdkfhsk)][Plen Bins: 0,50,0,50,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]