Added extra TLS memory boundary checks

This commit is contained in:
Luca Deri
2020-05-31 08:28:02 +02:00
parent b6eef17e54
commit c793e16050
+62 -56
View File
@@ -390,77 +390,83 @@ static void processCertificateElements(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi
i += 3 /* skip the initial patten 55 1D 11 */;
i++; /* skip the first type, 0x04 == BIT STRING, and jump to it's length */
i += (packet->payload[i] & 0x80) ? (packet->payload[i] & 0x7F) : 0; /* skip BIT STRING length */
i += 2; /* skip the second type, 0x30 == SEQUENCE, and jump to it's length */
i += (packet->payload[i] & 0x80) ? (packet->payload[i] & 0x7F) : 0; /* skip SEQUENCE length */
i++;
if(i < packet->payload_packet_len) {
i += (packet->payload[i] & 0x80) ? (packet->payload[i] & 0x7F) : 0; /* skip BIT STRING length */
if(i < packet->payload_packet_len) {
i += 2; /* skip the second type, 0x30 == SEQUENCE, and jump to it's length */
if(i < packet->payload_packet_len) {
i += (packet->payload[i] & 0x80) ? (packet->payload[i] & 0x7F) : 0; /* skip SEQUENCE length */
i++;
while(i < packet->payload_packet_len) {
if(packet->payload[i] == 0x82) {
if((i < (packet->payload_packet_len - 1))
&& ((i + packet->payload[i + 1] + 2) < packet->payload_packet_len)) {
u_int8_t len = packet->payload[i + 1];
char dNSName[256];
while(i < packet->payload_packet_len) {
if(packet->payload[i] == 0x82) {
if((i < (packet->payload_packet_len - 1))
&& ((i + packet->payload[i + 1] + 2) < packet->payload_packet_len)) {
u_int8_t len = packet->payload[i + 1];
char dNSName[256];
i += 2;
i += 2;
/* The check "len > sizeof(dNSName) - 1" will be always false. If we add it,
the compiler is smart enough to detect it and throws a warning */
if(len == 0 /* Looks something went wrong */)
break;
/* The check "len > sizeof(dNSName) - 1" will be always false. If we add it,
the compiler is smart enough to detect it and throws a warning */
if(len == 0 /* Looks something went wrong */)
break;
strncpy(dNSName, (const char*)&packet->payload[i], len);
dNSName[len] = '\0';
strncpy(dNSName, (const char*)&packet->payload[i], len);
dNSName[len] = '\0';
cleanupServerName(dNSName, len);
cleanupServerName(dNSName, len);
#if DEBUG_TLS
printf("[TLS] dNSName %s [%s]\n", dNSName, flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.client_requested_server_name);
printf("[TLS] dNSName %s [%s]\n", dNSName, flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.client_requested_server_name);
#endif
if(matched_name == 0) {
if((dNSName[0] == '*') && strstr(flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.client_requested_server_name, &dNSName[1]))
matched_name = 1;
else if(strcmp(flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.client_requested_server_name, dNSName) == 0)
matched_name = 1;
}
if(matched_name == 0) {
if((dNSName[0] == '*') && strstr(flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.client_requested_server_name, &dNSName[1]))
matched_name = 1;
else if(strcmp(flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.client_requested_server_name, dNSName) == 0)
matched_name = 1;
}
if(flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names == NULL)
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names = ndpi_strdup(dNSName),
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names_len = strlen(dNSName);
else {
u_int16_t dNSName_len = strlen(dNSName);
u_int16_t newstr_len = flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names_len + dNSName_len + 1;
char *newstr = (char*)ndpi_realloc(flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names,
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names_len+1, newstr_len+1);
if(flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names == NULL)
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names = ndpi_strdup(dNSName),
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names_len = strlen(dNSName);
else {
u_int16_t dNSName_len = strlen(dNSName);
u_int16_t newstr_len = flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names_len + dNSName_len + 1;
char *newstr = (char*)ndpi_realloc(flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names,
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names_len+1, newstr_len+1);
if(newstr) {
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names = newstr;
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names[flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names_len] = ',';
strncpy(&flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names[flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names_len+1],
dNSName, dNSName_len+1);
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names[newstr_len] = '\0';
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names_len = newstr_len;
}
}
if(newstr) {
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names = newstr;
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names[flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names_len] = ',';
strncpy(&flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names[flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names_len+1],
dNSName, dNSName_len+1);
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names[newstr_len] = '\0';
flow->protos.stun_ssl.ssl.server_names_len = newstr_len;
}
}
if(!flow->l4.tcp.tls.subprotocol_detected)
if(ndpi_match_hostname_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_TLS, dNSName, len))
flow->l4.tcp.tls.subprotocol_detected = 1;
if(!flow->l4.tcp.tls.subprotocol_detected)
if(ndpi_match_hostname_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_TLS, dNSName, len))
flow->l4.tcp.tls.subprotocol_detected = 1;
i += len;
} else {
i += len;
} else {
#if DEBUG_TLS
printf("[TLS] Leftover %u bytes", packet->payload_packet_len - i);
printf("[TLS] Leftover %u bytes", packet->payload_packet_len - i);
#endif
break;
}
} else {
break;
}
} /* while */
break;
}
} else {
break;
}
} /* while */
if(!matched_name)
NDPI_SET_BIT(flow->risk, NDPI_TLS_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH); /* Certificate mismatch */
if(!matched_name)
NDPI_SET_BIT(flow->risk, NDPI_TLS_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH); /* Certificate mismatch */
}
}
}
}
}