Improved logic for checking invalid DNS queries

This commit is contained in:
Luca Deri
2024-06-23 22:27:19 +02:00
parent aa1d7247d1
commit e92568e4bb
+23 -10
View File
@@ -768,17 +768,30 @@ static void ndpi_search_dns(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct, st
if (hostname_is_valid == 0)
ndpi_set_risk(flow, NDPI_INVALID_CHARACTERS, "Invalid chars detected in domain name");
dot = strchr(_hostname, '.');
if(dot) {
uintptr_t first_element_len = dot - _hostname;
/* Ignore reverse DNS queries */
if(strstr(_hostname, ".in-addr.") == NULL) {
dot = strchr(_hostname, '.');
if(dot) {
uintptr_t first_element_len = dot - _hostname;
if((first_element_len > 48) && (!is_mdns)) {
/*
The lenght of the first element in the query is very long
and this might be an issue or indicate an exfiltration
*/
if((first_element_len > 48) && (!is_mdns)) {
/*
The lenght of the first element in the query is very long
and this might be an issue or indicate an exfiltration
*/
ndpi_set_risk(flow, NDPI_DNS_SUSPICIOUS_TRAFFIC, "Long DNS host name");
if(ends_with(ndpi_struct, _hostname, "multi.surbl.org")
|| ends_with(ndpi_struct, _hostname, "spamhaus.org")
|| ends_with(ndpi_struct, _hostname, "rackcdn.com")
|| ends_with(ndpi_struct, _hostname, "akamaiedge.net")
|| ends_with(ndpi_struct, _hostname, "mx-verification.google.com")
|| ends_with(ndpi_struct, _hostname, "amazonaws.com")
)
; /* Check common domain exceptions [TODO: if the list grows too much use a different datastructure] */
else
ndpi_set_risk(flow, NDPI_DNS_SUSPICIOUS_TRAFFIC, "Long DNS host name");
}
}
}
@@ -790,7 +803,7 @@ static void ndpi_search_dns(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct, st
flow->host_server_name,
strlen(flow->host_server_name),
&ret_match,
NDPI_PROTOCOL_DNS);
NDPI_PROTOCOL_DNS);
if(ret.app_protocol == NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN)