Error detected with valgrind.
==13127== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
==13127== at 0x483EF58: strlen (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==13127== by 0x1A93B6: ndpi_strdup (ndpi_main.c:159)
==13127== by 0x1C07CC: processClientServerHello (tls.c:1678)
==13127== by 0x1C0C4C: processTLSBlock (tls.c:712)
==13127== by 0x1C0C4C: ndpi_search_tls_tcp.part.0 (tls.c:849)
See also 8c3674e9
Error detected with valgrind.
==125883== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
==125883== at 0x438F57: processClientServerHello (tls.c:1421)
==125883== by 0x43B35A: processTLSBlock (tls.c:712)
==125883== by 0x43B1C4: ndpi_search_tls_tcp (tls.c:849)
==125883== by 0x42C60B: check_ndpi_detection_func (ndpi_main.c:4426)
==125883== by 0x42E920: ndpi_detection_process_packet (ndpi_main.c:5301)
==125916== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
==125916== at 0x438D7D: processClientServerHello (tls.c:1379)
==125916== by 0x43B35A: processTLSBlock (tls.c:712)
==125916== by 0x43B1C4: ndpi_search_tls_tcp (tls.c:849)
==125916== by 0x42C60B: check_ndpi_detection_func (ndpi_main.c:4426)
==125932== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
==125932== at 0x438C1D: processClientServerHello (tls.c:1298)
==125932== by 0x43B35A: processTLSBlock (tls.c:712)
==125932== by 0x43B1C4: ndpi_search_tls_tcp (tls.c:849)
==125932== by 0x42C60B: check_ndpi_detection_func (ndpi_main.c:4426)
==125950== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
==125950== at 0x438D4F: processClientServerHello (tls.c:1371)
==125950== by 0x43B35A: processTLSBlock (tls.c:712)
==125950== by 0x43B1C4: ndpi_search_tls_tcp (tls.c:849)
==125950== by 0x42C079: check_ndpi_detection_func (ndpi_main.c:4443)
* An external file which contains known malicious SSL certificate SHA-1 hashes
can be loaded via ndpi_load_malicious_sha1_file(...)
Signed-off-by: Toni Uhlig <matzeton@googlemail.com>
* Syntax error caused buffer pointer to equal 0x1
Possible copy-paste from lines 141-142?
* Another comma operator
* whitespace matching
* another comma operator
* another comma operator
* another comma operator
* Check for non-zero payload
Latest QUIC versions use TLS for the encryption layer: reuse existing code
to allow Client Hello parsing and sub-classification based on SNI value.
Side effect: we might have J3AC, TLS negotiated version, SNI value and
supported cipher list for QUIC, too.
In a Client Hello, the presence of both SNI and ESNI may obfuscate the real
domain of an HTTPS connection, fooling DPI engines and firewalls, similarly
to Domain Fronting.
Such technique is reported in a presentation at DEF CON 28:
"Domain Fronting is Dead, Long Live Domain Fronting: Using TLS 1.3 to evade
censors, bypass network defenses, and blend in with the noise"
Full credit for the idea must go the original author
At the moment, the only way to get the pdf presention and related video is via
https://forum.defcon.org/node/234492
Hopefully a direct link (and an example pcap) will be available soon